News from the FOW

[Duc d' Elchingen]

a Francuzi?

[Nemanja]

a Francuzi?

za sada :x :oops: :?

[Duc d' Elchingen]

jebeni glupi nacionalisti sa usranog smrdljivog ostrva

[Bojan Tiger Ace]

Neko je resio da Ameri nisu dovoljno jaki sa Jumbo-sima pa su resili da im daju njihovu verziju Pantera i KonigsTiger-a...

Enter M26 Pershing & M26E Super Pershing

http://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=4383

Ne sumnjam da ce biti upola jeftiniji od svabskih pandama....

[Nemanja]

Neko je resio da Ameri nisu dovoljno jaki sa Jumbo-sima pa su resili da im daju njihovu verziju Pantera i KonigsTiger-a...

Enter M26 Pershing & M26E Super Pershing

http://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=4383

Ne sumnjam da ce biti upola jeftiniji od svabskih pandama....

nisi u pravu. preskupi su. u isto vreme su Nemci drastično pojeftinili i imaju reluctant trained i rv opcije....zabavno, zar ne :D
u stvari statovi se sve više približavaju arapsko izraelskim :lol:

[deka]

Prava stvar će da bude M3A3E2 sa 76mm topom, mogućnost da imaš 3 x 76mm tenka po vodu i uopše M4A3 šasije sa .50call - ovima umesto .30call - ova...

[Bojan Tiger Ace]

Prava stvar će da bude M3A3E2 sa 76mm topom, mogućnost da imaš 3 x 76mm tenka po vodu i uopše M4A3 šasije sa .50call - ovima umesto .30call - ova...

Dakle izmisljanju nikad kraja?

Ja ocekujem u sledecoj knjizi Maus-a itd... (P.S. znam da postoji kao arty opcija u Levithians)

Zombi panzergrenadire, letece tanjire itd... :D

[Histericni Istoricar]

Kada su mogli da Nemcima izmisle artiljeriju mogu i Amerima da daju King cobru ( M4A3E2 sa 76 mm topom) ili super M26.

[Bojan Tiger Ace]

Koju artiljeriju?

Bio je jedan super m26 u ratu? Tom logikom i Rusi treba da dobiju IS-3, npr...

[bojan]

Dakle izmisljanju nikad kraja?

50+ komada M4A3E2 je dobilo 76mm topove, konverzija je planirana za sve.
25 komada M26 je napravljeno sa 90mm T15E1 topom, planirano je 1000. Samo je manji broj dobio dodatni oklop.

Ako imas nesto protiv ovoga onda imaj i protiv Ferdinanda (65 komada) i raznih ostalih nemackih krseva od po 5 komada napravljenih koji su vec u igri.

[bojan]

Tom logikom i Rusi treba da dobiju IS-3, npr...

IS-3 NIJE ucestvovao uopste. Ni na dalekom istoku niti igde.
Sa druge strane probna partija od 10 t-44 je ucestvovala, ukljucujuci i borbe (doduse nemacka oklopna vozila nisu sreli).

[deka]

Prava stvar će da bude M3A3E2 sa 76mm topom, mogućnost da imaš 3 x 76mm tenka po vodu i uopše M4A3 šasije sa .50call - ovima umesto .30call - ova...

Dakle izmisljanju nikad kraja?

A šta je tu izmišljanje

Ako se pozabaviš malo tenkovima iz tog perioda, moći ćeš da vidiš da su do 1944. američani shvatili da su "obični" Sherman-i iliti M4/M4A1 bili prevaziđeni, tj. infariorni u odnosu na švabovske...
Odnosno prevedeno u FoW-ovski jezik Front Armour 6, Side 4, a germanski AT od 10 do 14, što će reći od vrlo male do nikakve šanse za preživljavanje...
I rešili su da poprave svoje šanse... To je dovelo do zamene M4 i M4A1 Sherman-a sa M4A3/M4A3 Late Sherman-ima, koji su imali bolji oklop (FA-7), bolje motore (Detroit Finest-move 14" umesto 12") i Protected Ammo...

A onda su su rešili da i njima omoguće malo lakše preživljavanje susreta sa švapskim 88-icama, tako što su naručili tenak sa mnogo boljim oklopom u odnosu na standardne M4A3 Sherman-e, i tako je došao M4A3E2, u narodu poznatiji kao Jumbo (i sa sobom doneo FoW germanima "omiljeno" pravilo Jumbos Lead the Way, Fron Armour 12 i Side Armour 8).
Operativna taktika američana je bila da tenaci idu u koloni, kako bi mogli brže da reaguju na akcije neprijatelja, kao i da ponude manje meta protivniku koji ih očekuje. A tu se Jumbo pokazao mnogo bolje i bio je izdržljiviji od ostalih verzija Sherman Tenkova...

Kada su američanske oklopne divizije videle Jumbo-e na delu potražnja za njima je bila toliko velika i to i od strane posada tenkova i komandira jedinica, da je čak i general Paton bio na listi čekanja...
Kada je video da isporuka ne teče onako kako je planirano, Paton je rešio da njegovi mehaničari uz pomoć lokalnih majstora preprave M4A3 Sherman-e u nešto nalik Jumbo-u, dodavanjem oklopnih ploča koje su skidali sa neoperatvnih M4 varijanti sa varenim trupom, pa čak i sa ostavljenih nemačkih tenkova...
A među prepravljenim tenkovima je bilo najviše Shermana sa 76mm topom, čak i neki sa HVSS vešanjem (koje koristi i "laka osmica" M4A3E8, FoW - Smooth Ride-Nema penala na korišćenje stabilizatora ako se kreće do 6")...
Za oko tri nedelje je konvertovano oko 100 tenkova, koji su postali poznati kao Expedient Jumbos.
Prilikom konvertovanja oklopa, menjali su i .30Call-ove sa .50Call-ovima, tako da bi bio prilično zahvalan da mi objasniš šta je tu sve izmišljeno

Takođe cijenim da će sve to imati adekvatnu cenu u poenima, tako da nema potrebe za gunđanjem...

[Histericni Istoricar]

Izmislili su Nemcima istu kolicnu artiljerije, da bi bili igrivi. Nemacka artiljerija je bila losa i slaba.

[Millenium]

Nazalost Herr Djole nije bas tako nemacka artillery nije bila inferiorna ni u jednom pogledu sem po mozda kolicini ali su zato bili generalno najkvalitetniji u svojim klasama

Standard division level field howitzers.
1,985 kg combat weight. German 10.5cm leFH18 howitzer.
2,260 kg combat weight. USA M101 105mm howitzer.
2,450 kg combat weight. Soviet M1938 122mm howitzer.

Standard corps level field howitzers.
4,150 kg combat weight. Soviet M1938 152mm howitzer.
5,530 kg combat weight. German 15cm sFH18 howitzer. First FA weapon equipped with rocket assisted ammunition to increase range.
5,600 kg combat weight. USA M114 155mm howitzer.

misljenje saveznika o taktikama nemaca za vreme samog rata http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt0 ... llery.html

German Artillery Tactics

Germans could also do map based fire (“blind”) or impromptu fire spotted by an FO (Sulzen, 2000). Their impromptu fire was dependent on have accurately surveyed the battery’s position and firing positions for the FO; it also involved complicated maths by the battery when called upon, and hence was slow to arrive, about 15 min from call to shell fall. The Germans carefully accounted for a range of factors (elevation changes, wind, temperature, etc.) that the British ignored. That meant, although slow, they tended to be quite accurate. Firing time against a previous target, or near a previous target, was faster as they kept their previous calculations. If the Germans had time to prepare they pre-plotted (“registered”) firing points so that effective fire could be quickly delivered as needed.

I to sve ne vodeci racuna o vrlo visoko kvalitetnoj samohodnoj arty kao sto bili grille ili hummel (za ciju losu reputaciju moze jedino u skorije vreme da "pumpa" igrica WoT) ali s obzirom da svi znamo da game balance i real life nemaju veze jedni sa drugim Fow jednostavno sve nemacke tehnike objedinjuje kroz povecan firepower jer kao sto po samim saveznicima damo zakjuciti ona je bila cak i preciznija od sve sem mozda nekih elitnih jedinica US artillery.

[bojan]

...
Standard division level field howitzers.
1,985 kg combat weight. German 10.5cm leFH18 howitzer.
2,260 kg combat weight. USA M101 105mm howitzer.
2,450 kg combat weight. Soviet M1938 122mm howitzer.

Osim sto leFH moras ponovo namestati nisanske sprave nakon bilo kakvog motorizovanog transporta, jer isti nije bio predvidjen za isti. Pa se onda slomi kolevka topa ako ga vuces po teskom terenu (cesta prituzba sa istocnog fronta). Plus 122mm gadja duplo tezom granatom, a M2 (M101 je oznaka uvedena nakon Korejskog rata) je "neunistiv" zbog krajnje jednostavne konstrukcije.

Standard corps level field howitzers.
4,150 kg combat weight. Soviet M1938 152mm howitzer.
5,530 kg combat weight. German 15cm sFH18 howitzer. First FA weapon equipped with rocket assisted ammunition to increase range.
5,600 kg combat weight. USA M114 155mm howitzer.

Zato su Rus i Amer (M1, opet M114 je oznaka od kasnije - ne brkati sa 155mm M1 topom) i Amer pucali mnogo nakon sto bi sFH morao na remont zbog prekomlikovane konstrukcije hidraulicke kocnice. "Srecom" nije da su nemci ikada imali dovoljno dobru organizaciju dotura municije pa da se kvare masovno...


Organizacija nemacke artiljerije je bila takva da je bila u potpunosti inferiorna kako prema sovjetskoj masovnosti tako i prema americkoj fleksibilnosti. Nije bilo prakticno nikakvog nacina da se u slucaju potrebe brzo organizuje zaprecna vatra artiljerije viseg nivoa bez da se ide preko vise instance, sto je stravicno usporavalo vreme odziva. Diviziona artiljerija je bila relativno brza na odzivu*, ali je patila od gornjih mana.

I to sve ne vodeci racuna o vrlo visoko kvalitetnoj samohodnoj arty kao sto bili grille ili hummel (za ciju losu reputaciju moze jedino u skorije vreme da "pumpa" igrica WoT) ali s obzirom da svi znamo da game balance i real life nemaju veze jedni sa drugim Fow jednostavno sve nemacke tehnike objedinjuje kroz povecan firepower jer kao sto po samim saveznicima damo zakjuciti ona je bila cak i preciznija od sve sem mozda nekih elitnih jedinica US artillery.

Grille je bio samohodni top, uglavnom koriscen za direktno gadjanje ciljeva. Hummel je bio dobar ali je problem bio sto nemci nikada nisu uspeli mehanizovati (cak dobrim delom ni motorizovati) dotur municije pa je ta "sjajna" artiljerija zavisila od vozova, konjskih zaprega i zaplenjenih kamiona iz pola Evrope da bi radila. Sto je dobrim delom negiralo prednost samohodnosti zbog ogranicene prohodnosti neophodnih vozila podrske (jer je zaliha municije na samom samohodnom orudju bila mizerna).

"Preciznija od svih" ali malo morgen. Sistem navodjenja artiljerijske vatre im je bio na nivou 1.s.r.

*Po preciznosti odziva, red je otprilike - Finci, Britanci, Ameri. Tim redom. Mada je Fince klalo hronicni nedostatak radio stanica, ali su i dalje imali mnogo bolju organizaciju od Nemaca.

[Histericni Istoricar]

Samo cu reci hvala Beta.

[Millenium]

I ja zahvaljujem Beti na njegovom iscrpnom ekspozeu i unapred se izvinjavam sto je ta razmena misljenja rezultirala trenutnom devijacijom od orginalne teme ovog thread'a iliti nasih malih metalnih i plasticnih ww2 cika Stoga se ja vise u ovoj debati vise necu oglasavati Ali za kraj moram reci iako je svaka tacka koju je Beta naveo ili 100% tacna ili ima high meritum ona zaobilazi sustinu mog odgovora djoletu poenta nije uzasna nemacka logistika.Ne zaboravimo uzasne same UFA medie gde se velicaju nemacki artiiljerci koji upadaju u rusiju vukuci kroz blato modernu artiljeriju na konjicima.to je jednostavno bio rezultat sulude ideje napada na SSSR samim time i logisticka nocna mora svih rodova sem mozda SS koji je zbog privilegovanosti mogao da racuna na vecinu sdfkz i opel blitz podrske.ali nista od toga ne umanjuje dostignuca nemacke artiljerije i pod time ne racunam cak ni sevastopolj i upotreba arhaicnih Dore i Karla koji su bili efikasni ali bez dovoljno rezervnih cevi (a i promene u odnosu air suporta bi ih verovatno dotukle kasnije da su ponovo upotrebljeni) ne poenta je dali je nemacka artiljerija kako je receno slaba i jadna mislim da se sve slazemo da je odgovor ne jer vecina zaboravlja da se za razliku od vecine konkurencije ona koristila za specificne fire misije koje su sto puta nadmasivale improvizaciju cak i brilijantne US odbrane Bastogne'a a da za kraj ne bi to ipak bio slucaj he said and i say no evo sta sami amerikanci u poslednjim danima rata daju kao zakljucak

Source: U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces" (Mar'45)
Officially released from restricted status by the U.S. Army Center For Military History.


1. GENERAL

The fundamental principle of German offensive doctrine is to encircle and destroy the enemy. The objective of the combined arms in attack is to bring the armored forces and the infantry into decisive action against the enemy with sufficient fire power and shock. Superiority in force and fire power, the employment of armored forces, as well as the surprise element, play a great part in the offensive.

Coordination between the combined arms under a strong unified command is, the Germans emphasize, an absolute requisite to the success of these shock tactics. This has become more and more true as the Allies have developed effective antitank weapons and have adopted deeper defenses, limiting the self-sufficiency of German tanks. To counter these measures, the Germans have increased the mobility and armor protection of their motor-borne infantry, and have mounted a large proportion of both their direct and indirect heavy support weapons on self- propelled carriages.

In attempting thoroughly to paralyze the defender up to the moment of the tank-infantry assault, the Germans realize that even the most formidable forces are never sufficient for overwhelming superiority on the entire front. They therefore select a point of main effort (Schwerpunkt) for a breakthrough, allotting narrow sectors of attack (Gefechtsstreifen) to the troops committed at the decisive locality. There they also mass the bulk of their heavy weapons and reserves. The other sectors of the front are engaged by weaker, diversionary forces. In selecting the point of main effort, the Germans consider weaknesses in the enemy's defensive position; suitability of the terrain, especially for tanks and for cooperation of all arms; approach routes; and possibilities for supporting fire, especially artillery. Although the Germans select a point of main effort in all attacks, they usually also make plans for shifting their main effort if they meet unexpected success elsewhere. To allow such shifts, sufficient reserves and a strong, unified command are organized.

An attack along a narrow front, according to German doctrine, must have sufficient forces at it's disposal to widen the penetration while maintaining its impetus, and to protect the flanks of the penetration. Once the attack is launched, it must drive straight to its objective, regardless of opposition.


2. TYPES OF ATTACK

a. FLANK ATTACK (Flankenangriff)

The Germans consider that the most effective attack is against the enemy's flank. The flank attack develops either from the approach march - sometimes through a turning movement - or from flank marches. It attempts to surprise the enemy and permit him no time for countermeasures. Since mobility and the deception of the enemy at other positions are required, the flank attack is most successfully mounted from a distance; the troop movements necessary for the maneuver can be executed in close proximity to the enemy only with unusually favorable terrain or at night. Attacks are launched on both flanks only when the Germans consider their forces clearly superior.


b. ENVELOPMENT (Umfassungsangriff)

The envelopment is a combination flank-and-frontal attack especially favored by the Germans. The envelopment may be directed on either or both the enemy's flanks, and is accompanied by a simultaneous frontal attack to fix the enemy's forces. The deeper the envelopment goes into the enemy's flanks, the greater the danger of being enveloped oneself. The Germans therefore emphasize the necessity of strong reserves and organization of the enveloping forces in depth. Success of the envelopment depends on the extent to which the enemy is able to dispose his forces in the threatened direction.


c. ENCIRCLEMENT (Einkreisung).

An encirclement, the Germans think, is a particularly decisive form of attack, but usually more difficult to execute than a flank attack or an envelopment. In an encirclement, the enemy is not attacked at all in front, or is attacked in front only by light forces, while the main attacking force passes entirely around him, with the objective of maneuvering him out of position. This requires extreme mobility and deception.


d. FRONTAL ATTACK (Frontalangriff).

The Germans consider the frontal attack the most difficult of execution. It strikes the enemy at his strongest point, and therefore requires superiority of men and materiel. A frontal attack should be made only at a point where the infantry can break through into favorable terrain in the depth of the enemy position. The frontage of the attack should be wider than the actual area (Schwerpunkt) chosen for penetration, in order to tie down the enemy on the flanks of the breakthrough. Adequate reserves must be held ready to counter the employment of the enemy's reserves.


e. WING ATTACK (Flugelangriff)

An attack directed at one or both of the enemy's wings has, the Germans teach, a better chance of success than a central frontal attack, since only a part of the enemy's weapons are faced, and only one flank of the attacking force or forces is exposed to enemy fire. Bending back one wing may give an opportunity for a flank attack, or for a single or double envelopment.


f. PENETRATION (Einbruch) AND BREAKTHROUGH (Durchbruch)

These are not separate forms of attack, but rather the exploitation of a successful attack on the enemy's front, wing, or flank. The penetration destroys the continuity of the hostile front. The broader the penetration, the deeper can the penetration wedge be driven. Strong reserves throw back enemy counterattacks against the flanks of the penetration German units are trained to exploit a penetration to the maximum so that it may develop into a complete breakthrough before hostile countermeasures can be launched on an effective scale. The deeper the attacker penetrates, the more effectively can he envelop and frustrate the attempts of the enemy to close his front again by withdrawal to the rear. The attacking forces attempt to reduce individual enemy positions by encircling and isolating them. The Germans do not consider a breakthrough successful until they overcome the enemy's artillery positions, which usually is the special task of tanks. Reserve units roll up the enemy's front from the newly created flanks. The Germans often refer to this maneuver as "Keil und Kessel".


3. ORGANIZATION OF THE ATTACK

a. ATTACK ORDER.

The attack order (Angriffsbefehl) generally contains the objective of the attack, the disposition of the infantry, unit sectors and boundaries, disposition and support missions of the artillery, location of reserves, and the time of attack. The order is not drawn up in accordance with any stereotyped form, but as a rule follows this pattern:

(1) Estimate of the situation (disposition of hostile and friendly troops)
(2) Mission.
(3) Assembly areas for the forward companies; objective; sector boundaries; orders for the continuation of combat reconnaissance.
(4) Instructions for the preparation of the heavy-weapons fire support, especially for massed fire.
(5) Orders to the artillery for fire preparation and coordination.
(6) Assembly areas for the reserves.
(7) Time of attack.
(8) Instructions for rear services (medial service and supplies).
(9) Location of command posts.
(10) Miscellaneous.



b. SECTORS OF ATTACK.

The width of a sector assigned to an infantry unit in the attack depends on the unit's mission and battle strength, on terrain conditions, on the available fire support of all arms, and on the probable strength of enemy resistance. Normally the sector assigned to a platoon is between 165 and 220 yards. A company attack sector is about 330 to 550 yards. A battalion sector is about 440 to 1,100 yards, while a division sector may be 4,400 yards to 5,500 yards. These sectors also provide the boundaries for the other arms, especially for the artillery in support of the infantry, although the artillery may utilize favorable observation positions in neighboring sectors. This also applies to the heavy infantry weapons.

For large units the sectors are determined from the map; for smaller units, from the terrain. These sectors extend as deep into enemy territory as the plan of battle may require. As the situation develops, changes are frequently made. Important points always lie within units' sectors, unless they are to be attacked by several units. The Germans do not consider it necessary to occupy the whole width of the sector with troops. Open flanks ordinarily are not bounded.


c. FIRE PLAN.

Fire superiority is achieved through coordination of the infantry and artillery weapons. The basis of the fire plan (Feuerplan) is the regulation of the commitment of all weapons. The fire plan includes the following:

(1) Assignment of combat missions.
(2) Distribution of observation sectors and fields of fire for the infantry and the artillery.
(3) An estimate of capabilities of the artillery for effective execution of the combat mission.
(4) Orders for the commencement of fire and fire schedules.
(5) Orders for the preparation for massed fire.
(6) Instructions for ammunition supply.


The Germans stress the coordination of flat and high trajectory weapons so that all dead spaces are covered by fire. Lack of signal equipment however, often hinders the application of this principle.


4. CONDUCT OF THE ATTACK

a. GENERAL.

Most of the German successes in the present war have been achieved with armored formations. Years of secret training and equipping were devoted to the development of the Panzer division. The original German blitzkrieg tactics were based on the belief in the irresistible power of tank formations operating independently with the support of dive- bombers. Considerable modifications have taken place in this theory over the past few years. At the present time, the offensive tactics of the Germans are less spectacularly bold than they were in 1939, but the fundamental theory behind them has changed remarkably little, though in their armored tactics they stress more tank-infantry coordination since unlimited air support is no longer at their command.

The main weight of all major German attacks since 1939 was borne by the Panzer division. Where infantry divisions have been employed, they were limited to local attacks on a comparatively minor scale, or to mopping up in rear of the Panzer divisions. The Germans never envisaged a full-scale attack by infantry formations on fixed defenses. German tactics have been to outflank or encircle the main area of the enemy defenses with tank formations and to have the infantry roll up the defenses from the rear, or to break frontally through the enemy defenses with massed tanks and develop the famous "Keil und Kessel" maneuver.

The Germans learned at heavy cost the futility of charging a hostile antitank defense with tank concentrations and of engaging in tank-versus-tank combat without having superiority in range and armament. They have learned that large formations of tanks cannot achieve a breakthrough, opposed by an effective screen of antitank guns, without the assistance of other arms. Therefore attention has to be given to the combined tactics of tanks and Panzer Grenadiers, the mechanized or motorized infantry who accompany the tanks.

Great emphasis in German offensive theory is laid on the role of the artillery, but in practice the artillery-support role has devolved to an ever-increasing degree on the tanks and assault guns. Nevertheless, the principle that the supporting fire should be concentrated on a narrow frontage where the tanks and infantry are most likely to achieve a breakthrough has been retained.

The fact that part of the enemy resistance is likely to remain undisclosed until the attack has already begun has caused the Germans permanently to decentralize a portion of the field artillery. This tendency has led to the emergence and continual development of the assault guns, whose main function is the close support of infantry and tanks in the attack. Their armor and mobility allow them to operate much farther forward than the field artillery.

The tendency to detach field artillery battalions from their field artillery regiment remains strong. In fact, this tendency is so prevalent that a concentration of massed artillery preceding an attack seldom is achieved, necessitating, as it does, a great degree of centralized control. The Germans however, replace the massed artillery fire to a large extent with the fire of multi- barreled mortars and rocket projectors, though these latter have not the accuracy of the former.

The Germans make a clear distinction between an attack made from movement and an attack from a prepared position, which is the more common of the two.


b: ATTACK BY MECHANIZED AND MOTORIZED FORCES.

(1) THE ATTACK

In armored-force operations, the Germans stress the need for the concentrated employment, at the decisive place and time, of the entire combined command of tanks and other arms, less necessary reserves. The tanks constitute the striking force of such a command and normally advance as the first echelon of the attack. Their primary mission is to break through and attack the enemy artillery, rather than to seek out and destroy enemy tanks, which can be more effectively engaged by antitank units. The mission of the other arms is to assist the tanks in their advance, and particularly to eliminated antitank weapons. The smallest combat unit in such a force of combined arms is the commune.

The basic formation for the tank platoon, company, and battalion are file, double file, wedge, and blunt wedge. The type of formation used for a specific task depends to a large extent on terrain conditions and the strength of enemy opposition. A German tank platoon normally consists of one command tank and two tank squads of two tanks each.

The tank regiment normally attacks in waves, in either of the following manners:

The tank regiment is echelon in depth, one tank battalion following the other. The regimental commander's location is between the two battalions. This formation has the advantages of a sufficiently wide front (about 1100 yards), and close contact by the company commander of his units in the conduct of the attack. When two tank battalions are attacking, one behind the other, it takes them about half an hour to pass their own infantry.

When the two-battalions-abreast formation is employed, it is almost essential that another tank regiment form the following wave. This formation usually has the disadvantage of being too wide. The regimental commander cannot observe his units, and he has no units of his own behind him which he can commit in a decisive moment. The attack normally proceeds in three waves.

The first wave thrusts to the enemy's antitank defense and artillery positions.

The second wave provides covering fire for the first wave, and then attacks the enemy's infantry positions, preceded, accompanied, or followed by part of the Panzer Grenadiers, who dismount as close as possible to the point where they must engage the enemy. The objectives of the second wave are the remaining antitank positions, positions of heavy infantry-support weapons, and machine-gun emplacements which hold up the advance of the infantry.

The third wave, accompanied by the remainder of the Panzer Grenadiers, mops up.

These three waves now often are telescoped into two, the first wave speeding through the enemy's positions as far as his gun positions, the second crushing the enemy's forward positions in detail and mopping up the opposition no dealt with by the first wave or which has revived since the first wave passed through.

A typical attack formation of this type might be divided up among the Panzer division's units as follows: the first wave, on a frontage of about 2,000 to 3,000 yards, might consist of one tank battalion, two companies forward, supported on the flanks by elements of the assault gun battalion. Close to the rear of the first wave usually follow one or two Panzer Grenadier companies in armored half-tracks. About 150 yards to the rear of the first wave moves the second wave, formed of the second tank battalion in the same formation, closely followed by the remainder of the armored Panzer Grenadiers, who are in turn followed at some distance by the motorized Panzer Grenadiers. The flanks are protected by antitank guns which normally operate by platoons, moving by bounds. The artillery forward observer travels in his armored vehicles with the first wave, while the artillery commander of the supporting artillery units usually travels with the tank commander. Assault guns normally also accompany the second wave.

The tanks help each other forward by fire and movement, medium or heavy tanks taking up hull-down firing positions and giving covering fire while the faster tanks advance to the next commanding feature. Then the latter give covering fire to the former moving forward to their next bound.

Once the first wave has reached the rear of the enemy's forward defenses, it pushes straight on to attack the enemy's artillery. As soon as these positions have been neutralized, the tanks reform beyond the artillery positions and either prepare to exploit the attack or form an all-round defensive position on suitable ground.

The tank commander, as the leader of the strongest unit, is in most cases in command of the combat team, and all the other participating arms (Panzer Grenadiers, artillery, engineers, and antitank units) are placed under him. The Germans realize that a strong and unified command is an essential feature of any military operation. For certain missions, however, tank units are attached to another arm, in which case the tank commander is consulted before the final plans for the operations are made.


(2) INFANTRY-TANK COOPERATION

When the enemy has well prepared positions with natural or constructed tank obstacles, the German infantry attacks before the tanks and clears the way. The objective of the infantry is to penetrate into the enemy position and destroy enemy antitank weapons to the limit of it's strength and the fire power of it's own support weapons, augmented by additional support and covering fire from the tanks and self-propelled weapons sited in their rear.

Only after the destruction of the enemy antitank defense can the tanks be employed on the battle line to the fullest advantage.

When the tank obstacles in front of the enemy position are already destroyed, and no additional tank obstacles are to be expected in the depth of the enemy's main defensive position, the infantry breaks through simultaneously with the tank unit. The infantry attack is conducted in the same manner as it would be without the cooperation of tanks. Heavy infantry weapons are kept in readiness to fire at possible newly discovered antitank positions. Of particular importance is protection of the open flanks by echeloning the flank units and employing heavy weapons at the flanks.

In most cases, the infantry follows the tanks closely, taking advantage of the fire power and paralyzing effects of the tanks upon the enemy's defense. The Germans normally transport the infantry to the line of departure on tanks or troop-carrying vehicles in order to protect the infantry and to increase it's speed. The infantry leaves the vehicles at the last possible moment, and goes into action mainly with light automatic weapons.

The tanks advance by bounds from cover to cover, reconnoitering the terrain ahead and providing protective fire for the dismounted Panzer Grenadiers. The tanks do not slow their advance to enable the infantry to keep continuous pace with them, but advance alone and wait under cover until the infantry catches up with the advance. Terrain that does not offer sufficient cover is crossed with the greatest possible speed.

The infantry attacks in small formations also by bounds under the fire cover of it's own heavy weapons and of the tanks, staying away from individual tanks because they draw the strongest enemy fire.

When a tank company attacks with infantry, there are normally two platoons on the line, one platoon back, and the fourth platoon in reserve. The interval between tanks is usually 100-120 yards. The tank's machine guns usually engage infantry targets at 1000 yards range and under, while the tank guns engage targets at 2,000 to 2,500 yards.

The coordination between tanks and Panzer Grenadiers moving into combat on armored half-tracks is similar to the technique employed in a purely armored formation, since the armored half-tracks are not only troop-carrying vehicles but also combat vehicles. When the terrain is favorable for tank warfare, the Panzer Grenadiers in their armored half-tracks follow immediately with the second wave, after the first tank wave has overrun the opponent's position. A deep and narrow formation is employed. After the penetration, the main mission of the Panzer Grenadiers is to overcome the enemy positions which survived the first wave.

In attacking enemy pillboxes, the Germans use combat groups consisting of tanks, infantry, and engineers, assisted by artillery. The normal composition of a combat group attacking one bunker is one platoon of tanks and one platoon of infantry reinforced by one squad of engineers. Before the combat group is committed against the enemy pillbox, artillery fires high explosives and smoke shells at the neighboring pillboxes to isolate them, shells the terrain between pillboxes, and conducts counterbattery fire. Under the protection fof this fire, the combat group advances close to the pillbox while other infantry units attack the enemy in the terrain between the pillboxes.

One tank squad covers the advances of the other tank squads and the infantry platoon by direct fire against the pillbox, particularly against the observation and weapons' openings. The first tank squad halts under cover whenever possible and covers the advance of the second tank squad.

When the combat group reaches a barbed wire obstacle surrounding the pillbox, the two tank squads have different missions. One tank squad remains in front of the pillbox, and it's tanks are driven into a position from which they can overlook the terrain, and watch out for antitank guns and machine-gun emplacements, while the other tank squad (the pillbox tank squad) rolls across the obstacle to enable the infantry and engineers to get close to the pillbox. The pillbox tank squad then fires on the pillbox at close range. The infantry squad meanwhile takes the surrounding terrain and covers the engineers who blast the entrance of the pillbox with TNT.

(3) ARTILLERY-TANK COOPERATION

Artillery support is of decisive importance for the preparation and the successful conduct of a tank attack. A unified command for the entire artillery controls the artillery fire as long as the infantry and tank units are fighting on the same line. When the tanks break through the enemy forward defense lines, the self-propelled artillery or any other artillery battalion designated for the support of the tank unit is placed under the command of the tank unit commander.

The Germans believe that the artillery fire must not check the momentum of the attack. Consequently the heaviest fire must fall well ahead of the tanks or outside their sector.

The mission of the artillery preparation before the attack is to destroy, or at least neutralize, the opponent's antitank defense in the area between the line of contact and the regimental reserve line. Continuous counterbattery fire prevents the enemy from shelling the tank assembly area and from breaking up the preparation of the tank attack.

The artillery has the following missions before the tank attack:

Counterbattery fire on enemy artillery located in positions which command the ground over which the tank attack is to be made.

Concentrations on enemy tanks in assembly areas.

Harassing fire on all areas in which the antitank units are located or suspected. Fire is heaviest on areas in which tanks cannot operate but from which they can be engaged effectively.

Adjusting fire with high explosives on probably enemy observation posts commanding the sector to be attacked. These observation posts are blinded with smoke as soon as the attack begins.

Experience has taught the Germans that the flanks of a tank attack are vulnerable. Therefore they assign to the artillery and the rocket projector units the task of protecting flanks by barrages using high explosives and smoke shells.

The artillery has the following missions during the tank attack:

Counterbattery fire.

Blinding enemy observation posts.

As the attack progresses, engaging successive lines of antitank defense, especially areas to the rear and flanks of the sector attacked.

Screening the flanks of the attack with smoke and neutralizing the enemy's infantry and rear areas.

Delaying the movement and deployment of enemy reserves,, particularly tanks.

The Germans stress that this wide variety of tasks must not lead to the wholesale dispersal of effort. The main task of the artillery is at all times the destruction of the enemy's antitank weapons, tanks, and artillery.

Liaison between artillery and tanks during the attack is established by the commanding officers and the artillery liaison group, which normally moves with the first wave. Artillery forward observers, if possible in armored observation posts, ride with the most forward elements. A German field expedient is for the tank unit to take along a forward observer in one of it's tanks. It often happens that the tankman himself has to take over the observation of the artillery. He himself can request fire and shift concentrations when the situation requires such change

http://etloh.8m.com/strategy/offense.html ja sam moje rekao i jos jednom se izvinjavam na odstupanju od glavne teme ovog topika

[Bojan Tiger Ace]

Izvinjavam se, ali ja ovo ne mogu da citam sve.

Isto tako se izvinjavam svima sto ne poznajem neke sitnije detalje tipa da je Paton cekao tenk pa je isfrustriran cekanjem narucio da mu prave od 76ice.

Ono sto sam ja zapravo hteo da kazem, a sto izgleda ostaje jedina stvar vezana za ovu temu jeste:

Upropastice BF igru sa izmisljanjem i dodavanjem novih stvari koje mi, igraci, moramo da kupujemo. Ja sam u hobiju 1.5 god i vec se metagame (valjda se tako zove) drasticno promenio.

Isto tako, cini mi se da se sve vise udaljava od realnosti, npr sa 7mom mehanizovanom koja ne izlazi na tablu bez Jumba. Koliko sam shvatio, na ETC npr svi ameri imaju po 2-3 jumba. Pa bem mu mater nije ih toliko bilo u ratu sta god vi rekli. Ovakvih primera ima mnogo.

To je igra i sve je to meni jasno, za neke (BF) je to biznis i to mi je jasno. Samo kazem da ja kao korisnik zelim da rekreiram ww2 jer da to ne zelim, igrao bih WH40k npr. A ovo se sve malo udaljava od ww2 i to mi se ne dopada.

Izmedju ostalog za to su krivi sermani koji su jaci od tigra (jeste opet taj tigar) a cinjenica stoji da su sve do kraja rata saveznici toliko srali u gace od pomena tigra da su mislili i za ostale tenkove da je tigar itd itd. Sermana se niko nije plasio, a ja kao komandir nemackih oklopnih snaga u FoW se ozbiljno razmislim sta da radim sa njima, cesto...

I na kraju, izvinjavam se svima koji misle da sam ih uvredio ili slicno, stvarno nije bila namera, to je posledica ovakvog suvoparnog nacina komunikacije, OBECAVAM da nisam forumski ratnik ))

:*

[deka]

Ja ti se izvinjavam na još jednom podužem postu, ali sam si tražio...

Isto tako, cini mi se da se sve vise udaljava od realnosti, npr sa 7mom mehanizovanom koja ne izlazi na tablu bez Jumba. Koliko sam shvatio, na ETC npr svi ameri imaju po 2-3 jumba. Pa bem mu mater nije ih toliko bilo u ratu sta god vi rekli. Ovakvih primera ima mnogo.

Elem, da si pročitao moj prethodni post bilo bi ti jasno, zbog čega svaki US Tank player ima 2 do 3 Jumbo Tenka...
To je zbog taktike upotrebe tenkova koju su koristili ametičani...
US tenkovi na maršu su napredovali u koloni, jedan iza drugog, kako bi protivniku koji ih eventualno očekuje dali što manje meta koje može da gađa...
A kada se neprijatelj otkrije dejstvovanjem na vodeći tenk, onda se kolona razvija i prelazi u borbeni poredak, i odgovara na napad..
I tu se M4A3E2, u narodu poznatiji kao Jumbo jako dobro pokazao, pošto ni jedan drugi tenk koji bi bio lako dostupan ne bi izdržao pogodak švapskih 88 i ostlaih PAK-ova...
Zato je svaki vod tenkova imao 1 Jumbo-a, koji je išao na čelu kolone, i odatle potiče i nativ pravila Jumbos Lead The Way...
Tako da analogno tome i svaki FoW igrač koji igra LW US tenake ima 2 do 3 Jumbo tenka... Jedan je 1IC, drugi je u 1. obaveznom vodu tenkova, i eventualni treći je u 2. obaveznom vodu tenkova... Ili neka varijacija toga...
Što se tiče broja tenkova, zvanično je od kasne 1944. do kraja rata proizvedeno i isporučeno na front 254 tenka M4A3E2. Plus onih oko 100 koje je prepravio Paton, što ukupno daje nešto više od 350 vozila u upotrebi...
Malo li ih je?

Malo da uporedimo neke brojeve:

PzKpfW V - Panther, uveden je u upotrebu '43. i proizveden u 6334 primeraka
PzKpfW VI - Tigar I, uveden je u upotrebu '42. i proizveden u 1350 primeraka
PzKpfW VIB - Tigar II liti King Tigar, uveden je u upotrebu '44. i proizveden u 485 primeraka
SdKfz 184 - Ferdinand / Elephant, uveden je u upotrebu '42. i proizveden je 91 primerak
SdKfz 186 - Jagdtiger, uveden je u upotrebu '44. i proizvedeno je 85 primeraka
SdKfz 166 - Sturmpanzer IV iliti Brummbar, uveden je u upotrebu '43. i proizvedeno je 313 primeraka
SdKfz 173 - Panzerjager V iliti Jagdpanther, uveden je u upotrebu '44. i proizvedeno je 382 primerka

da ni ne pominjemo

Sturmpanzer VI iliti Sturmtiger, uveden je u upotrebu '44 i proizvedeno je 19 primeraka
10.5cm K gepanzerte Selbstfahrlafette IVa iliti Dicker Max, koji je od 1941. napravljan samo u 2 prototipa
12.8 cm Selbstfahrlafette auf VK3001(H) iliti Sturer Emil, koji je od 1942. napravljen takođe u samo 2 prototipa

Za sve navedene germanske šklopocije postoje modeli i pravila za FoW, tako da nema potrebe nervirati se oko unapređenih sredstava koja su se pojavljivala kako je rat odmicao, a bila su lakše dostupna američanskim trupama nego germanskim...
Nema smisla porediti proizvodne kapacitete nemaca sa proizvodnim kapacitetima amerikanaca, a rusi su tek van konkurencije...
Shermani su u raznim varijantama proizvedeni u preko 50.000 primeraka, Willys MB - Jeep oko 355.000, čak je i T26 Pershing od kog je i počela rasprava do kraja rata napravljen u oko 2200 primeraka, dok su Rusi napravili T-34 u 34.780 primerka i T34/85 u oko 22.600 primeraka...

Izmedju ostalog za to su krivi sermani koji su jaci od tigra (jeste opet taj tigar) a cinjenica stoji da su sve do kraja rata saveznici toliko srali u gace od pomena tigra da su mislili i za ostale tenkove da je tigar itd itd. Sermana se niko nije plasio, a ja kao komandir nemackih oklopnih snaga u FoW se ozbiljno razmislim sta da radim sa njima, cesto...

Šta ćeš... Mada moje mišljenje je da se ova konstatacija odnosi na pešadiju, ali ne u tolikoj meri i na tenkiste, pogotovo na veterane iz 2. 3. 4. pa i 7. oklopne divizije
Tokom rata američani su tražili način kako da izađu na kraj sa nemačkim oklopom.
Kako promenom taktike, tako i nabavkom bolje oklopljenih tenkova, sa boljim topom i tako su modifikacijom osnovnog M4 dizajna nastali Jumbo, Easy 8 i slične spravice...
Dalje, kako je rat odmicao imali lakše dostupnu, bolju opremu, u velikim količinama, dok su nemci imali suprotnu situaciju...

Takođe US tenkisti su tokom rata učili nemačke taktike i unapređivali svoje, što je pored gore iznetog dovelo do toga da su posade Tigrova a i ostalijeh tenaka morale dobrano da se pomuče kako bi pobedili svoje američke parnjake...

Recimo neka statistika sa istočnog fronta je da na jednog Tigra dođe 8-10 ruskih tenaka, mahom T-34...

Normalno je da i FoW igrač koji igra LW sa nemcima mora malo više da se potrudi da uništi neke nove verzije Sherman tenkova, koji su se pojavljivali kako je rat odmicao, a ne kao u MW da samo ispali projektil u generalnom pravcu protivničkog tenaka, da ga uništi :D

[Nemanja]

joj, baš ste se raspisali...
Ja mislim da su Nemci u ovim novim knjigama dobro prošli-mnogo dobre i jeftine CT i RT tehnike. Imam 2 opcije iz Desperate measures spremne, pa ko hoće da isproba...

[Histericni Istoricar]

Boki kada su Nemci dobili Poresovog Tigra van Mid war Monstera, mogu i Ameri M26 i njegov super derivat. Inace ocekujem u skorije vreme i Kometu, sto da ne. Trebaju ljudima parice.

[deka]

Imam 2 opcije iz Desperate measures spremne, pa ko hoće da isproba...

Ti to izazivaš???

[Bojan Tiger Ace]

Mislim da je univerzalno resenje Tematizovanje bitaka i turnira...

Voleo bih da se borim sa super Pershingom, zaista, ali ne svaki put , nego kada znam da postoji mogucnost , kao u ratu.

Isto vazi i za jumba. Ok bilo ih je dosta, ali isto tako pravilo ne preslikava realnost, realno niko ne bi pucao 5 puta za redom u zver koju ne probija a jos 10 tenkova bleji oko pomenutog i roka...

Apsolutno se slazem i za nemacke sklopocije tipa sturmtiger, tiger P i slicno. I to mi je besmisleno da je moguce da na turniru se pojavi 10 sturmtigera npr, 5 ljudi uzme po 2 i eto. Zapadne ti da igras sa bas tih 5 ljudi i ispade svi nemci imaju sturmtigera. Naravno to je malo verovatnojer je sranje ali kapirate na sta ciljam.

Mali rebalans mi se cini da postaje neophodan. Sistem iz BG Kursk deluje veoma dobro, iako je neisproban.

P.S. ko ne zna, tamo se penetracije rade sa 2 kocke i AP vrednost opada na svakih 5 inca a ne na 16.

[Histericni Istoricar]

Mislim da je univerzalno resenje Tematizovanje bitaka i turnira...

Da za zajednicu od 35 aktivnih igraca i to ako se progleda kroz prste za ofarbanost i sl. Npr ako imas zelene ili sive tenkove mozes da igras i Afriku, ako su odgovarajuci tipovi tenka. Ali mislim da je trenutno to ne moguce.

[badtaste]

za sve USA igrače: U Bridge at Remagen Jumbo dobija Top Armor 2, a biće i revizija za BBG da se usklade, bez promene poena

[deka]

Kako što već rekoh, nekima se to baš neće svideti... :lol: :lol: :lol:

[badtaste]

http://www.flamesofwar.com/Portals/0/Do ... eFront.pdf

Novi LFTF, između ostalog:
- Update Jumba na TA2
- Pincer misija je sada malo drugacija
- Ako je TD Security section pinovana kada se TD otkriju, i oni su pinovani....

[Nemanja]

http://www.flamesofwar.com/Portals/0/Do ... eFront.pdf

Novi LFTF, između ostalog:
- Update Jumba na TA2
- Pincer misija je sada malo drugacija
- Ako je TD Security section pinovana kada se TD otkriju, i oni su pinovani....

I promenili supravila naval bombardmenta. Lice na onosto su imali po V2.

[Bojan Tiger Ace]

Kako što već rekoh, nekima se to baš neće svideti... :lol: :lol: :lol:

Ma ne, totalno mi je kul da moram da vodim KonigsTiger-a da bih ubio usrane sermane (namerno malim slovima) :P :D


Salim se, neka, i realno je da ima top 2, sigurno nisu bili toliko glupi da oklope front sa tonama celika a onda top ostave najlon...

[bojan]

1" isto kao i na obivnom.

[badtaste]

Ako neko želi da prelazi izvesni most na reci Rajni, nek se obrati uobičajenim kanalima

[Nemanja]

Ako neko želi da prelazi izvesni most na reci Rajni, nek se obrati uobičajenim kanalima

daj, daj :D

[Hertz]

U današnjem izdanju zvanične FoW internet stranice

http://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=4527

[Bojan Tiger Ace]

Cestitke Grenadiru!

[deka]

A u čemu je fora ovde???

Ako me sećanje ne vara GG je bio na FoW sajtu u sekciji gde predstavljaju nove retajlere još negde u februaru 2013. ?!?!?!

Jesu izgubli status, pa ga ponovo dobili, ili je u pitanju nešto drugo??

[Nemanja]

A u čemu je fora ovde???

Ako me sećanje ne vara GG je bio na FoW sajtu u sekciji gde predstavljaju nove retajlere još negde u februaru 2013. ?!?!?!

Jesu izgubli status, pa ga ponovo dobili, ili je u pitanju nešto drugo??

Status u svakom slučaju nismo izgubili, a vest jeste iz 2013.
btw. sprema se ogromna narudžbina za etc, popusti itd.... :D

[Histericni Istoricar]

End of July
FW230A Remagen Bridge Mat
AC015 Arado 234 B
UBX42 Rifle Company (Plastic)
US056 M4A3E2 Jumbo (with 75mm and 76mm gun option)

http://www.flamesofwar.com/

[bojan]

A onda kukaju na Super Peru... Cccc.

[Bojan Tiger Ace]

AC015 Arado 234 B

Sumanuto. Sad ce poceti kao Battlefield 1942 Secret Weapons :D

Ali, i dalje je do kraja rata bilo 200 Arada od kojih su se mnogi koristili za razliku od "Super Pere" kojih je bilo jedan.

[badtaste]

AC015 Arado 234 B

Sumanuto. Sad ce poceti kao Battlefield 1942 Secret Weapons :D

Odavno su počeli...
http://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=3368